The Anti-Semitic Policy of the SD from 1934 to 1938 (Part A)
Source: Michael Wildt, International conference: German Society's Responses to Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy 1933-1941, Yad Vashem, 10-13 February 1995.
On 24th May 1934 the IV/2 Division of the SS Sicherheitsamt sent a memorandum to its leader, Reinhard Heydrich, entitled Zur Behandlung der Judenfrage, which, amongst other things, contained the following statement:
Das Ziel der Judenpolitik muss die restlose Auswanderung der Juden sein. [...] Den Juden sind die Lebensmoeglichkeiten - nicht nur wirtschaftlich genommen - einzuschraenken. Deutschland muss ihnen ein Land ohne Zukunft sein, in der wohl die alte Generation in ihren Restpositionen sterben, nicht aber die junge leben kann, so dass der Anreiz zur Auswanderung dauernd wach bleibt. Abzulehnen sind die Mittel des Radau-Antisemitismus. Gegen Ratten kaempft man nicht mit dem Revolver, sondern mit Gift und Gas. Der aussenpolitische Schaden der Strassenmethoden steht in gar keinem Verhaeltnis zu dem oertlichen Erfolg.' 1
Of course this statement did not anticipate the later murder of the Jews by gassing, but the comparison of the Jews to vermin which should be fought by exterminators - a comparison which can be found in numerous chapters of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" - reveals to what extent the Jews had already become inhuman in the minds of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) of the SS (known as the SD), their "Ausrottung" (extermination) did not need to remain a purely metaphorical demand.
When Heinrich Himmler commissioned the dismissed marine officer Reinhard Heydrich in April 1931 to set up a secret service unique to the SS, at first its department in Munich only consisted of nothing more than himself and half a dozen office rooms without typewriters 2 . Three years later the SD comprised about 150 members of which however only a few worked full-time.
The number of informers was in fact higher, but in comparison with the size of the Gestapo, of which the Secret State Police Office (Gestapo) in Berlin alone included about 600 officers and employees in Spring 1934, not to mention the approx. 2000 officers in the Prussian State Police Offices, the SD looked infinitely insignificant.
Already at this stage however, the SD stood out with its clear and extensive concept on the Jewish issue, when its policy, as shown by the statement in the memorandum of May 1934, applied to the treatment of Jewish organisations, i.e. to give preferential treatment to the Zionists who openly demanded the emigration of the Jews to Palestine, in contrast to the assimilatory associations who were seeking an arrangement with the new leaders. This attitude prevailed during the coming months also amongst the political police. In a report by the Gestapo Commission on Jewish Affairs in November 1934 it was stated that:
[das] Bestreben der Staatspolizei dahin gerichtet [sei], den Zionismus weitgehendst zu foerdern und seine Auswanderungsbestrebungen zu unterstuetzen. Die Deutschen (Assimilanten) werden in ihrer Betaetigung so viel wie moeglich behindert, um sie zu veranlassen, in das Lager der Zionisten hinueberzuwechseln. [...] Insbesondere muessen alle Dienststellen ihr Bestreben darin setzen, die zionistischen Organisationen anzuerkennen und ihre Umschulungs- und Auswanderungsbestrebungen zu unterstuetzen und dabei gleichzeitig die Betaetigung der deutsch-jued. Gruppen zu behindern und diese so zu zwingen, den Gedanken des Sesshaftbleibens aufzugeben.' 3
The SD, in view of its anti-Semitic, racial-biological basic attitude, could not be differentiated from other National Socialist institutions. But the concept of the SD Department on Jewish Affairs was from the very beginning more radical and consistent than the competitive suggestions for their policy. In comparison with the instigative "Gefuehlsantisemitismus" spread by the Stuermer the SD was out to research into the "Judenfrage" objectively, rationally and with statistical precision.
The SD Department 11 112 concerned itself with the existing associations of the German Jews, marked the differences which, on the other hand, formed the basis of the Gestapo techniques for controlling the Jewish organisations in Germany from 1935 to 1938. The systematic murdering of the European Jews was still beyond the horizons of the SD in the thirties, but its mentality and the rationality of its policy was inherent with genocide.
Terror from below, laws from above In 1935 the annoyance amongst the NSDAP party ranks about the "slow development" of the persecution of the Jews, strongly encouraged by Streicher's inflammatory magazine Der Stuermer, began to let off steam in the form of local acts of violence. There were pogrom-type demonstrations throughout the whole Reich 4 . These were described in a report by the State Police Office in Berlin to the Ministry for Internal Affairs in the Reich and Prussia in August 1935 as follows:
Die Vorfaelle spielten sich in der Regel derart ab, dass sich in den Abendstunden junge Menschen in groesserer Anzahl vor den Eiskonditoreien einfanden und durch Zurufe deren Schliessung forderten. Gaeste und arisches Personal wurden bedroht und auch toedlich angegriffen, den Kaeufern wurde beim Verlassen der Geschaefte die Ware aus der Hand geschlagen. Ferner versuchte man durch Sprechchoere, wie "Kauft nicht bei Juden" das Publikum von dem Besuch der Eisdielen fernzuhalten. In zahlreichen Faellen wurden die Inhaber aufgefordert, das Geschaeft sofort zu schliessen, da sonst die Raeumung oder Demolierung des Lokals erfolgen werde. Nach der Schliessung wurden die Geschaefte mit Boykottzetteln und Stuermer-Blaettern beklebt. In der Nacht wurde diese Taetigkeit fortgesetzt. Ausser den Eisdielen wurden auch andere juedische Geschaefte mir Boykottzetteln und Plakaten beklebt und mit Farbe beschmiert; desgleichen wurden die Buergersteige mit judenfeindlichen Inschriften bemalt. Haeufig benutzte man zum Bekleben der Scheiben Wasserglas, das durch seine aetzende Wirkung die Schaufensterscheiben undurchsichtig und daher unbrauchbar machte. In zahlreichen Faellen wurden auch die Schaufensterscheiben in der Nacht eingeworfen.' 5
Whereas these acts of violence were first carried out by the "Hitler-Jugend" (HJ), gradually adults joined in too. The police, who, according to a report by the Berlin Gestapo, were trying "energisch im Keime zu ersticken" (to forcefully nip in the bud) such demonstrations, even provided individual officers as guards in front of "besonders gefaehrdeten Geschaeften" (particularly endangered businesses). But in doing so the police put itself in a difficult position because this procedure, as the report regretted, was "vom groessten Teil der Bevoelkerung nicht verstanden" (not understood by the majority of the local inhabitants). So the policemen were greeted with shouts of, for example, "Judenknechte" (slaves to the Jews) 6 .
In his report about the acts of violence which he sent at Himmler's command to the Chancellery of the Reich, Heydrich used the individual "Volkszorn" (anger of the people), released by divisions of the Party, as a justification for the demand for stricter laws and more hefty action against the Jews: Die fortwaehrend aus dem ganzen Reich einlaufenden Berichte ueber judenfeindliche Demonstrationen lassen erkennen, dass im Reichsgebiet eine immer weiter fortschreitende Unzufriedenheit mit dem bisherigen uneinheitlichen Vorgehen gegen das Judentum sich breitmacht. Der rassenmaessigeingestellte Teil des deutschen Volkes glaubt, die in der Stille bisher ergriffenen Massnahmen gegen die Juden als nicht genuegend ansehen zu muessen und fordert allgemein schaerferes Vorgehen.' 7
At the meeting of leaders in the Ministry of the Economy of the Reich on 20th August, Heydrich complained that the police was "immer die Leidtragende" (always the one to suffer for it). The present situation could only be solved by firstly introducing new lawful measures which, step by step, would achieve their aim of exterminating the influence of the Jews once and for all and secondly extensive political and ideological training and education of the party members and people's comrades. In concrete, Heydrich was demanding the prohibition of so-called "Mischehen" (mixed marriages), the prosecution of "Rassenschande" (racial disgrace), special laws for Jews and the limitation of freedom of movement, in particular a ban on moving into the cities 8 .
The radicals in the NSDAP as well as in the SS and SD understood the mechanism of success: "Entfesselter Volkszorn" (released anger of the people) broke through the bureaucratic barriers and let itself be used as an instrument for the legitimation of stricter state action. The Gestapo and SD then used the year 1936 to round up their own powers in a better way. At the command of Heydrich, a SD-Hauptamt took effect from the 15th January 1936 instead of the former divisions of the SD. This SD Hauptamt comprised administration and personnel departments as well as the Amt II whose task it was to track down the "Gegner der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung" (opponents to the National Socialist ideology) and the Amt Ill which was to serve as a counter-intelligence office. Within the Amt II of the Central Department II 1 "Weltanschauliche Auswertung" (ideological evaluation) there was the present Department II 112 for "Judentum" (Jewish affairs) which, after the former leader v. Mildenstein had left in the summer of 1936, was led by Kurt Schroeder.
Under pressure from Mildenstein, Adolf Eichmann transferred to his department at the beginning of 1935 and looked after the division "Zionists" which was the focal point of the SD policy. In spring 1937 the staff of the department was again exchanged and expanded. One new addition was Theodor Dannecker, previously official on Jewish Affairs for the SD Oberabschnitt South West and currently official for "Assimilants", Dieter Wisliceny, who led the department from April 1937 onwards, and Herbert Hagen, who finally took over the leadership of 11 112 in the late Autumn of 1937. Now they had all the people together who were to mould the anti-Semitic policy of the SD. Apart from Dannecker none of them had excelled before as "Judenexperte", in fact these men had only gained their reputation as "specialists" from the Department II 112.
The SD Headquarters in Berlin directed special attention to the training of regional experts. At a training conference in March 1936 it was obvious from reports by the Oberabschnitte that - in the interest of the SD Hauptamt - the regional Commissions for Jewish Affairs were still in a somewhat underdeveloped condition. Apart from the SD in Chemnitz and in Hanover the experts were responsible not only for the division "Juden" but also other specialised fields. In Stuttgart two men were responsible for the divisions Freemasons, Judaism, Library, and Emigration. In Duesseldorf there had only been an auxiliary officer for the past six weeks for the divisions Marxism, Churches, National Opposition and Judaism, and even in Berlin there was only one single official responsible for the divisions "Juden, Greuelpropaganda, Homosexualitaet" (Jews, Atrocity Propaganda and Homosexuality) as well as for matters concerning informers from the ranks of the DAF. In the SD departments, which in general were only staffed by very few people, it was usual to have the official positions doubly and even triply manned. Halle an der Saale may have been an extreme example, where the SD official for "Juden" and "Mittelbewegung" was actually employed as a porter, but this was still really typical 9 .
A large proportion of the conference participants was transferred within the coming months so that the conference was only able to produce a lasting effect in those cases where the experts were able to keep to their specialised fields. This made the central training in Berlin even more important. Eichmann wrote about a total of eight Oberabschnitt officials, who in August 1936 had been commanded to Department II 112 of the SD Hauptamt for training as follows: Die meisten kamen daher mit nur oberflaechlichen Kenntnissen hier an, und es wurden die wenigen, fuer die Schulung zur Verfuegung stehenden Tage dazu benutzt, sie von Grund auf in die Materie einzufuehren. Als Erfolg kann die Abteilung II 112 zweifellos jetzt schon buchen, dass es ihr gelungen ist, die gewuenschte Gleichrichtung der OA-Referenten in weltanschaulicher und sachlicher Hinsicht im Sinne des SD-Hauptamtes sicherzustellen.' 10
The specific profile which the SD tried to give their Jewish experts was formulated by Wisliceny and Hagen in their "Richtlinien und Forderungen an die Oberabschnitte" in April 1937: Der Sachbearbeiter II 112 bei den Oberabschnitten und Unterabschnitten darf nicht der Typ der intellektuellen Theoretiker sein. Es ist nicht absolut notwendig, dass er Akademiker ist. Er muss wendig und aktiv im Aussendienst sein, dabei klar und nuechtern an die Bearbeitung der ihm gestellten Aufgaben herangehen. Maenner, die lediglich rein geistig mit dem Problem des Judentums 'ringen', sind fuer die Arbeit auf den SD-Oberabschnitten und - Unterabschnitten ungeeignet.' 11 Objectivity and commitment were being demanded of them, but not secluded intellectuality or even unrealistic academicism.
Preliminary action
Within a regionally limited framework the SD was able to prove that, in co-operation with the Gestapo, it was indeed able to put things into practice, although it had no official authorisation to carry out executive functions. After a majority of the voters in Upper Silesia had expressed its wish in March 1921 to remain in the German Reich and after it had been divided, Germany and Poland had signed an agreement in May 1922 to protect minority groups and this was to be valid for the next 15 years. With an additional protective term of two months, this agreement expired on 15th July 1937. This meant, according to Adolf Eichmann in his "Disposition fuer die Judenbearbeitung im Gebiet des SD-OA Suedost" of 10th May 1937 that auch in Oberschlesien die Moeglichkeit vorhanden war, das Judenproblem in seiner Ganzheit zu erfassen' 12 , for now all the discriminating laws against the Jews became valid even there. Eichmann suggested registering all the Jews, arresting leading Jewish officials immediately and prohibiting Jewish organisations. Special attention should be given to attempts by the Jews to sell their property to Poland.
This crash program, formulated by Eichmann, approved by Six and, after it had also been signed by Heydrich, was sent at the end of May to the SD Oberabschnitt South East in Breslau, was designed to carry out corresponding concrete executive tasks. Eichmann himself was ordered at the end of May to go to Breslau to watch over the correct observation of the instructions.
Compared with the Gestapo, this conceptional initiative of the SD led to a change of emphasis in its favour. Heydrich's so-called "Funktionsbefehl" dated 1st July 1937, which was intended to clarify the relationship between the Gestapo and the SD, provided the opportunity of extending its own competence boundaries. According to Heyrich's command the SD, in view of Judaism, was to take over alle allgemeinen und grundsaetzlichen Fragen (in denen staatspolizeiliche Vollzugsmassnahmen nicht in Betracht kommen)" and the Gestapo "alle Einzelfaelle (in denen staatspolizeiliche Vollzugsmassnahmen in Betracht kommen)' 13 . How the command was really put into practice is shown by the instruction by Werner Best, Heydrich's deputy and the Chief Administrator of the Gestapo, to transfer all the files of the Gestapo Jewish Commission to the SD, including those, according to Wisliceny's report to Six, nicht nur abgeschlossenen Vorgaenge, sondern ueberwiegend laufende Sachen, die zukuenftig vom SD zu bearbeiten sind' 14 .
This meant that the SD not only had access to important information but without them it was hardly possible to form any initiatives, queries, legal proceedings concerning their policy towards the Jews. It seemed obvious that the Department II 112 should deduce from this eine gewisse geistige Fuehrung durch den SD' 15 . The Gestapo and the SD continued to form an in their policy towards the Jews. But after the SD had shown proof of its con over the past few years, it was now institutionally commissioned with the basic planning of the policy towards the Jews even within the security police system.
Compulsory Emigration
The focal point of the SD policy against the German Jews was their expulsion.
Already in the paper dated May 1934 the "Endziel der Judenauswanderung" was documented, later reports and notes by the SD Department II 112 were always concentrated on this principle and evaluated every political step after this, whether it served towards this aim or not.
In January 1937 the SD was presented with an extensive memorandum entitled "Zum Judenproblem" in which the "Entjudung Deutschlands" was put forward as a basic demand 16 .
The memorandum took up the National Socialist dread that the Jewish emigrants could establish new world conspiratorial centres in other countries and expressed the following limitation right at the beginning: Eine derartige Loesung kann nur die Auswanderung nach solchen Gebieten sein, die auf keiner hohen Kulturstufe stehen - um dadurch zu verhindern, dass die Juden neuen Reichtum anhaeufen.' In a detailed selective process of exclusion, the possible countries of destination, which could be considered as having a "niedrige Kulturstufe" were investigated and finally a list was produced limiting the possibilities to Ecuador, Columbia, Venezuela and Palestine only. Before the expulsion of the Jews had been even generally passed by the decisive authorities of the NS state as being the "Loesung der Judenfrage", the author had already envisaged in his report the next stage, namely the settlement of the Jews in inhospitable areas. The Madagascar Plan, which followed at a later date and which already included the extermination aspect, was based on similar considerations, since the planners were well aware that the island could offer no chances of survival whatsoever for many millions of people.
This anti-Semitic attempt at depriving half a million people of their rights, of expropriating them and removing ("entfernen") them from the German Society, as Hitler had already demanded in 1919, met with social, economical and bureaucratic stumbling blocks. This not having foreseen is an obviously distinctive sign of the ideological way of National Socialist thinking. Time and time again its anti-Semitic policy hit on self-created dead ends or traps, which not considered pragmatically - this is a feature particular to ideological behaviour - but constantly maximalistically, had to be overcome even more radically. The intention of forcing the German Jews to emigrate could not just be realised by the "Akt des Willens" alone, but was confronted with a great number of difficulties and the "Loesungen" of each of these in turn caused an accumulation of new obstacles.
The number of countries prepared to take in German Jews could not exactly be described as large. The immigration figures were strictly limited and only those had a chance who could offer either a qualified training as a craftsman or substantial capital, i.e. who were in a position to, so to speak, purchase their own immigration permit. Palestine represented the only area in the world where, according to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, an explicit national homeland for the Jewish people' was to be created. In fact Palestine took in more German Jewish immigrants than any other country between 1933 and 1936 17 . For this reason it played an important part in the considerations of the SD. Wisliceny and Hagen wrote in their "Richtlinien" in April 1937 that the Palestine issue should receive the full attention of the SD da von ihr letzten Endes die Loesung der Judenfrage in Deutschland abhaengt.' Even Wisliceny went to the XX. Zionist Congress in Zurich at the end of July 1937 to take a look at the Zionist attitude to the British Plans for division for himself. The encouragement of Zionism by the Gestapo and the SD reached a somewhat bizarre but definitely seriously meant climax in the journey of Herbert Hagen and Adolf Eichmann to the Middle East in the autumn of 1937.
But for the National Socialists the expulsion of the German Jews was not enough, they also wanted their property and therefore created a further dilemma in their compulsory emigration policy because there was hardly a country that was interested in poverty stricken immigrants. The avariciously accelerated pauperisation of the German Jews did not cause an increase in the number of emigrants, but rather of those dependent on welfare. In 1933 36% of the Jewish population was under 30 years of age and 10% over 65 years, in 1939 the ratio had changed drastically and stood at 19% to 21%. In 1933 just under half of all German Jews worked for a living, in 1939 only 16%. On the other hand more than 70% of all Jews over 14 were registered an "professionless self-employed" in the census lists, i.e. they lived off their savings or from trivial allowances and pensions 18 . About 218,000 Germans of the Jewish faith still lived in Germany in 1939 and their chances of leaving the country were completely uncertain. Although this made the balance look rather successful in a National Socialist sense, the anti-Semitic policy had come to a dead end in 1937/38.
References:
1. Memorandum SD IV/2 to Heydrich, 24.5.1934; Zentrum fuer die Aufbewahrung historisch-dokumentarischer Sammlungen ("Sonderarchiv"), Moskau (following: Moskau), 501/1/18, fol. 18-20; printed in: Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935-1938 . Eine Dokumentation . Herausgegeben von Michael Wildt, Muenchen 1995, p. 66-69. Cf. Also the well-versed essay of Susanne Heim, "Deutschland muss ihnen ein Land ohne Zukunft sein". Die Zwangsemigration der Juden 1933-1938, in: Arbeitsemigration und Flucht (Beitraege zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik 11), Berlin/Goettingen 1933, p. 48-81.
2. ShlomAronson, Reinhard und die Fruehgeschichte von Gestapo und SD , Stuttgart 1971, p. 56. Concerning to this earlpof the SD cf. also: George C. Browder: Foundations of the Nazi Police State. The Formation of Sipo and SD, Lexington/Kentucky 1990; and George C. Browder, Hitler's Enforcers. The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution , New York/Oxford 1996.
3. "Gegenwaertiger Stand der Judenfrage", Gestapa II 1 B 2, November 1934; Moskau, 501/1/18, fol. 49-56. Cf. also the documents of the Bavarian Political Police in: Hans Mommsen, "Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938, in: Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, 10 (1962), p. 68-87.
4. For regional cases cf. Kurt Paetzold, Faschismus, Rassenwahn, Judenverfolgung. Eine Studie zur politischen Strategie und Taktik des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus (1933-1935) , Berlin (DDR) 1975, p. 227-233; Saskia Rohde, "Zwischen Verfolgung und Shoa. Die Zerstoerung der Synagogen in Westfalen," in: Arno Herzig, Karl Treppe, Andreas Determann (Hg.), Verdraengung und Vernichtung der Juden in Westfalen , Muenster 1994, p. 76-90; Ian Kershaw, "Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung. Reaktionen auf die Judenverfolgung," in: Bayern in der NS-Zeit II , herausgegeben von Martin Broszat und Elke Froehlich, Muenchen 1979, p. 281-348.
5. Staatspolizeistelle Berlin to Reichs- und preussische Ministerium des Innern, 22.8.1935; Moskau 500/1/379, fol. 108-113.
6. Ibid.
7. Heydrich to Reichskanzlei, 16.7.1935; cited by Werner Jochmann, Gesellschaftskrise und Judenfeindschaft in Deutschland 1870-1945, Hamburg 1988, p. 245-246.
8. About this conference there are still existing several reports of which the report of the Reich Chancellery (Nuremberg document NG-4067) is best known. But it does no mention the presence of Heydrich. The Gestapo report her quoted is - as far as I know - cited for the first time; Gestapa II 1 B 2, "Bericht ueber die am 20.8.35 im Reichswirtschaftsministerium stattgehabte Besprechung ueber die praktische Loesung der Judenfrage," 20.8.1935; Moskau 500/1/379, fol. 75-85.
9. Cf. the reports from the SD-Oberabschnitte, March 1936; Moskau, 500/3/320, fol. 171-187.
10."Bericht ueber den Erfolg der Schulung der Oberabschnittsreferenten," 1.9.1936; Moskau, 500/3/320, fol. 197-198.
11."Richtlinien und Forderungen an die Oberabschnitte," 21.4.1937; Bundesarchiv, R 58/544, fol. 31-40.
12."Disposition fuer die Judenbearbeitung im Gebiet des SD-OA Suedost," 10.5.1937; Moskau, 500/1/403, fol. 45-48.
13."Gemeinsame Anordnung fuer den Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrer-SS und die Geheime Staatspolizei" des Chefs des Sicherheitshauptamtes und Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei 93, 1.7.1937; Bundesarchiv, R 58/239, fol. 198-203.
14.Wisliceny to Six, 20.7.1937; Moskau, 500/3/315, fol. 152-154.
15."Richtlinien und Forderungen an die Oberabschnitte," 21.4. 1937 (cf. Note no. 11).
16.Memorandum "Zum Judenproblem," January 1937; Bundesarchiv, R 58/956, fol. 2-19.
17.Cf. Herbert A. Strauss, "Jewish Emigration from Germany. Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (II)," in: Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 26 (1981), p. 343-409.
18.Avraham Barkai, Vom Boykott zur 'Entjudung'. Der wirtschaftliche Existenzkampf der Juden im Dritten Reich 1933-1943 , Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 168-169.
